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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Appellant responds and hereby objects to the Appellee's Statement of the Facts.
1. The Appellant was stopped by Charlie Wilson of the Utah Highway Patrol on March
2, 1993.
2. At the time of the issuance of a citation the Appellant 'preferred' not signing the
citation, promising Officer Wilson he would appear at the Nephi Precinct Court within 14 days.
3. As promised, out of courtesy, the Appellant appeared Specially in the Nephi Precinct
Court on March 15, 1993. (Contrary to Appellee's assertion, Appellee's Brief at 2.)
4. At the time of Appellant's Special Appearance, he filed a Special Appearance, Demand
For Summons and Formal Information, and Judicial Notice with the Nephi court. (R. at 11-14)
5. Notwithstanding the insufficient Summons, the Appellant appeared Specially in the
Nephi court on April 28, 1993.
6. The trial court dismissed two equipment violations upon proof of compliance by
Appellant.
7. Appellant did not refuse to enter a plea to the offense of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124
(1992), as alleged by Appellee (Appellee's Brief at 3), but requested additional time in which
to plead pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
8. At the hearing on May 5, 1993, the Nephi court demanded a plea from the Appellant,
who responded by filing an Arraignment and Plea. (R. at 9-10., cited in Appellee's Brief at 3,
erroneously intended to support contention Appellant 'refused' to plea.)
9. On June 8, 1993, Justice Court Judge Williams transferred the case to the trial court
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(Fourth Circuit Court, Juab County), voluntarily recusing herself pursuant to motion filed by
Appellant. (R. at 17-20)
10. On June 10, 1993, Notice of Hearing set for June 18, 1993, was received by
Appellant. (R. at 22.)
11. At the hearing on June 18, 1993, the Appellant objected to the trial court's lack of
in personam jurisdiction over him, whereupon the trial court served him with an insufficient
Summons.
12. The Appellant was rushed to trial 6 days later on June 24, 1993, over his objection,
despite the fact that he had requested hearings (R. at 34-35, 58-59, and Appellant's Brief Exhibit
H.), and an Enlargement of Time. (R. at 28-29, and Appellant's Brief Exhibit K.)
13. The Appellee filed an amended Information charging a different offense (Utah Code
Ann. § 41-2-104 (1992)) from the original information charging Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124
(1992), thereby prejudicing the Appellant's substantial rights.
14. The Appellant sought clarification of the ambiguous nature of the information by
filing a Request for Hearing (R. at 34-35, and Appellant's Brief Exhibit H.), wherein he sought
to strike the ambiguous information and put the trial court on notice that he would be filing
certain motions, including a motion for a bill of particulars.
15. The request for additional hearings and more time to obtain clarification of the
elements of the charge were denied by the trial court and the Appellant was rushed to trial on
June 24, 1993.
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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Appellee is correct in asserting that the charging language of the amended information
stayed exactly the same. However, by altering the statute reference, the offence was changed.
Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 4(d) was incorrectly applied.
The trial court erred in not following Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 29(d) by refusing to certify
Appellant's Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice to another judge to make a determination as to its
legal sufficiency.
The Appellant sought clarification of the offense and the elements the prosecution
intended to prove. The Appellant requested a hearing to address the ambiguous information and
requested to have time to file a motion for a bill of particulars. (R. at 34-35, and Appellant's
Brief Exhibit H.) Appellant was prevented from obtaining this clarification due to being rushed
to trial.
Appellant was very specific in how the conviction was derived from a vague
interpretation of the statute. (Appellant's Brief at 17.) Appellant specifically attacks the trial
court's improper application of the statute in convicting the Appellant. (Appellant's Brief at 17.)

Appellant takes issue with Appellee's statement that Appellant did not submit jury
instructions. It was the intention of the Appellant to obtain Appellee's jury instructions prior
to trial. (R. at 34-35, and Appellant's Brief Exhibit H.)

The court denied this due process

procedure. Appellant filed Objections to Court Proceedings on June 21, 1993, (R. at 30-33, and
Appellant's Brief Exhibit J), specifically objecting in #5, to a lack of pre-trial conference to
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address the jury instructions issues, exchanging questions, and all matters pursuant to the jury
demand.
At trial, the Appellant pursuant to the court's request handed jury instructions to the clerk
to be read but the court failed to read them. Appellant did in fact submit jury instructions at
trial but the court did not present them to the jury. (R. at 62-66.) Appellee confirms this fact
in his brief by stating Appellant did not submit jury instructions. (Appellee's Brief at 5.)
Because of these facts, the Court, absent a transcript, may still infer that the trial court violated
Appellant's due process by not reading his jury instructions to the jury.
Appellant takes issue with Appellee's assertion that he was not specific in outlining
irregularities in the court proceedings. (Appellee's Brief at 5.) Appellant, in his brief, outlines
more than six specific irregularities.

(Appellant's Brief at 18-19.) Appellant also alleges

numerous irregularities in the trial court proceedings. (Appellant's Brief at 19.)
Appellant takes issue with Appellee's argument that he did not refer the reviewing court
to citations in the record. This argument is without merit. Appellant inserted the relevant parts
of the record, those he relied, in his brief as exhibits, in accordance with Utah R.App.Proc.
Rule 24(a)(9). This was done for the convenience of the reviewing court.

RESPONSE TO POINT I OF APPELLEE
ARGUMENT
Appellant takes issue with Appellee's argument that no additional offense was charged
in the amended information. (Appellee's Brief at 5.) Appellee misconstrues Utah R.Crim.P.
Rule 4(d), which states,
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"The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4(d) (1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (1992) and Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124 (1992), have
fundamentally different elements. In the case of State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (Ut. App.
1987), this Court analyzed the different elements of the crimes of theft by receiving and theft
by concealing. Following this logic, Appellant compares the elements in the two statutes in
question. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124 has the following elements:
1) Licensee shall have license in possession while operating a motor vehicle.
2) Licensee shall display license upon demand of police officer, justice of the peace,
field deputy, or inspector of the Division.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 has the following element:
1) No person may operate a motor vehicle on a highway unless licensed as an operator
by the Division.
The Appellee likens Appellant's case before this Court to the case in State v. Peterson,
681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), because the "basic charge" remained the same. (Appellee's Brief
at 6.) This argument is without merit for the following reasons. First, in Peterson, the trial
court only allowed the prosecution to amend the information by changing the statutory reference
with the same basic charge remaining the same, namely aggravated assault. In the present case
the Appellee's main premise is flawed. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124 does not forbid a person
from driving on an expired license. It directs a person to carry a license and be prepared to
display it to authorized personnel.
5

In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 specifies that a person should obtain a license
to operate a vehicle on the public highways.

Appellee's claim that the language of the

information remained the same is true. Because the language of the original information was
incongruent with respect to the referenced statute, the Appellee was in error when he states that
the basic charge remained the same. In fact the 'language of the information' is the only thing
that remained the same. (Appellee's Brief at 6.) Following the Appellee's logic one would have
to conclude that both statutes (Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124 and § 41-2-104) are 'expired license'
statutes. This is simply not true. Different offenses were charged in the informations.
According to Ramon, 'under the rule the trial court may allow an information to be
amended if two conditions are met: (1) no additional or different offense is charged, and (2)
the substantial rights of the defendants are not prejudiced.' See State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d at
1062. Both conditions must be met. In the present case a different offense was charged and the
Appellant's substantial rights were prejudiced, as he prepared a defense based on the elements
found within Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124.
Appellee refers to State v. Lancaster, 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988), as justification for the
amended information. (Appellee's Brief at 8.)

Appellee's argument is without merit for the

following reasons. In Lancaster, the change in the amended information was a change in a
subsection of the same statute, from Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5(2)(b) (1978) to §
76-5-103.5(2)(a) (1978). Both subsections deal with the same basic charge, aggravated assault.
Secondly, in Lancaster, defense counsel brought the error to the attention of the trial
court in a pre-trial motion to dismiss wherein the court amended the information before trial.
Defense counsel at least had some time to prepare for trial. Id. at 872. In the present case the
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amended information was presented to the Appellant at trial with an arraignment on the new
charge immediately preceding trial.
Lastly, the amended information in Lancaster reduced the charge from a capital felony
provision requiring intent, to a felony of the first degree. No prejudice to the defendant was
present; the amendment actually reduced the severity of the charge.
Appellee attacks Appellant's claim that the information was faulty because no language
of the statute was explicitly stated. (Appellee's Brief at 8.) Appellee claims that this is not a
requirement and cites Ramon. Appellant takes exception to this argument. Referring to the two
conditions required in order to amend informations the Ramon Court declared,
In general, these two conditions are met where the proposed amendment to an
information merely recites language of the statute originally charged.
{State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d at 1062.)
The court uses the phrase 'recites language of the statute originally charged.'

As

previously discussed, the Appellee did not at any time recite the language of any statute.
'Informations that fail to contain the crime's essential statutory elements do not state crimes and
a charging document that fails to apprise the defendant of all of the statutory elements of the
crime is constitutionally defective.' See State v. Davis, 808 P.2d 167 (Wash.App. 1991).
Appellee's argument is legally insufficient and without merit. He misconstrues the true
intent of Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The amended information charged
a new offense, substantially prejudicing Appellant's rights. The Appellant requests this Court
to reject point I of Appellee's argument.
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RESPONSE TO POINT II OF APPELLEE
This issue is novel due to the fact that the justice court judge did not challenge
Appellant's Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice. (R. at 21.) She did not submit the affidavit to
another judge to pass on its legal sufficiency pursuant to Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 29(d). Absent
a showing of actual bias or prejudice, a judge is obligated to certify an affidavit to another
judge. By not following the provision of the rule, actual bias and prejudice can be deduced.
By voluntarily recusing herself, the justice court judge admitted to bias and prejudice toward the
Appellant. (R. at 21.)
Appellee claims that Appellant was not entitled to file an affidavit of bias and prejudice
against the trial court judge because a similar affidavit had been filed previously against the
justice court judge. (Appellee's Brief at 10.) Appellee bases this argument on Utah R.Civ.P.,
Rule 63(b), via Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 81(e). This claim is clearly in error. Rule 81(e) states:
"These rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where
there is no other applicable statute or rule..."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(e).
There is an applicable rule in this case: Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 29, which contains none
of the limitations that Appellee claims exist. Therefore, Utah R.Civil.P., Rule 63(b) is not
controlling. According to Utah R.Cr.P. Rule 29(c), the trial court judge should have proceeded
no further until the challenge was disposed of. The trial court erred in refusing to comply with
the requirements of Rule 29(c) and improperly dismissed Appellant's affidavit.
In Appellee's brief, he incorrectly applies Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 63(b) as well. (Appellee's Brief
at 9-10.) He states the portion of the rule that says "...No party shall be entitled in any case to
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file more than one affidavit...", claiming it has relevance in the instant case. Appellee's
argument is illogical. If a case is transferred to another judge, does that absolutely preclude the
new judge from demonstrating any bias and prejudice? And if extreme bias and prejudice is
displayed by the new judge to a party it doesn't matter, and the judge can summarily dismiss
the affidavit? The party has no remedy at law? The provision of the rule is plain. Whenever
an affidavit is filed the challenged judge is to proceed no further until the challenge is properly
disposed of by following the rule. These procedures are mandatory not discretionary. Appellant
claims this provision in Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 63(b), refers to only one affidavit per judge.
This Court recently decided in Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023 (Ut. App. 1993), that
judges are required to follow the procedures outlined in Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 63(b), whenever
an affidavit of bias and prejudice is filed against them. Id. at 1025. This was not done in
Appellant's case which is currently on appeal. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to follow the rule. Appellant requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reject Point II of Appellee's
argument.

RESPONSE TO POINT HI OF APPELLEE

In responding to Appellee's argument, Appellant maintains that the first question before
the Court is to assess whether the Appellant waived his right to further notice. See State v.
Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1028. The Supreme Court has held that if a defendant in a criminal action
has requested additional information through a bill of particulars, and that information would
have given further notice, then the defendant has not waived this right. Id. at 1031. Appellant
also maintains that the second question before the Court is whether the notice given in the

9

present case was adequate.
The Appellant filed a request for hearing and pre-trial conference with notice to the court
that he needed clarification and further notice of the charge against him. (R. at 34-35, and
Appellant's Brief Exhibit H.) In his motion he put the court on notice that he would file a
motion for a bill of particulars. In addition, Appellant sought to strike the information for all
of the reasons previously delineated.
Appellee claims Appellant did not ask for a bill of particulars and therefore the State was
not obligated to set forth the elements of the offense charged. (Appellee's Brief at 11-12.) Two
questions arise with this position. First, was the Appellant given reasonable opportunity to
obtain further notice of the charge? Second, what elements of the offense charged are required
in an information?
With six days to prepare for trial, the Appellant did not have sufficient time in which to
seek clarification of the offence. The court made it very clear that it did not want to spend any
more time helping the Appellant obtain further notice or clarification on any other matter.
Appellee's argument in Point III is without merit for all of the above stated reasons. The
Appellant requests the Court decline to give it any weight.

RESPONSE TO POINT IV AND V OF APPELLEE

Appellee claims that Appellant's issues four and five are vague. (Appellee's Brief 13-15.)
He states that the statute convicting the Appellant is routinely used when people no longer have
a valid license. He claims that the statute (assumably Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104), describes
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this kind of conduct which has long been held illegal. (Appellee's Brief at 13.)
Appellee does not address the substance of Appellant's argument. (Appellant's Brief at
17.) Actually, Appellee confirms the argument. He is correct in stating that this statute is the
only one used for this type of offense. Appellant argues that the element of "driving on an
expired license" is not found within the four corners of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104, and thus
is constitutionally vague with respect to 'driving on an expired license.'
Appellee's final argument that the Appellant did not cite anywhere in the record where
his due process rights were violated is a frivolous argument on two grounds. First, Appellant
outlined at least six specific violations in his brief. (Appellant's Brief at 18-19.) In addition to
outlining specific due process violations, Appellant refers the reviewing Court to affidavits and
Objections to Court Proceedings filed by Appellant containing numerous irregularities.
(Appellant's Brief at 19, Exhibits H, I, and J.)
Second, the Appellant followed Rule 24(a)(9), of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
by inserting relevant portions of the record in his exhibits. This was done for the convenience
of the reviewing Court. The Appellant directs the Court to those portions of the record he relies
on pursuant to the rule.
The Appellee cites State v. Olmos, 111 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986), in arguing for the Court's
dismissal of Appellant's arguments. A few facts of this case will be helpful in assessing the
credibility of Appellee's argument. The record in Olmos was sparse. Id. at 287. It is also
stated in Olmos,
11

...defendant has failed to refer to pages of the record in support of his points on appeal.
These deficiencies will normally require us to assume regularity in the proceedings and
correctness in the judgement appealed from."
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State v. Olmos, 111 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986).
The record in the present case could hardly be sparse as Appellee has constantly claimed
Appellant filed more pleadings than would normally be filed in the most serious of 1st degree
felonies. (Appellee's Motion in Support of Summary Disposition, as cited in Appellant's Brief
Exhibit B.) The Appellant did not fail to refer to pages of the record, he included the record
he relies on in the exhibits found within his brief. Finally, in Olmos, the Court states these
deficiencies will 'normally' require them to assume regularity in the proceedings below. There
seems to be some discretion the Court can use based upon the record before them.
The Appellant requests the Court of Appeals to reject Point IV and V of Appellee's argument.

CONCLUSION

The Appellee has unsuccessfully addressed the Appellant's arguments. There has not
been a credible showing to overcome any of Appellant's arguments on appeal. The
Appellee's amending of the information at the beginning of trial was not in accordance with
Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 4(d). Despite Appellant's objections, the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the amended information to stand.
The trial court continued to abuse its discretion by summarily dismissing Appellant's
Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice. The trial court refused to follow Utah R.Crim.P. Rule 29(d)
by certifying the affidavit to another judge to determine legal sufficiency.
The court erred in not granting hearings to clarify for Appellant the notice requirements
pursuant to his rights in article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
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The conviction of the Appellant was derived from a vague misapplication of a statute.
The Appellant prays for relief from the Judgment entered against him and that the Utah Court
of Appeals will reverse his conviction in the interests of justice.

Dated this day
Respectfetty submitted,

idard/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Ralph Stoddard, do hereby certify that on this day,
personally mailed, first class postage prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant to:

Donald J. Eyre, Jr.
Attorney for Appellee
125 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Utah Court of Appeals
230 S. 500 E., #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

tj^ddara, Accused/Appellant

ADDENDUM

Utah Const., art. I, sec. 12.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 81(e).
These rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where
there is no other applicable statute or rule...
Utah Rules of Criminal procedure 4(d).
The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state
the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon
the same set of facts.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29 (c),(d).
Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue.
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action or proceeding files an
affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding has a bias or prejudice, either
against the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge shall
proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification,
he shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith certified to another named judge of the
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged judge does not question the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient,
another judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom
the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge shall be called to try the
case or to conduct the proceeding. If the judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not find
the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to that effect and the challenged
judge shall proceed with the case or proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124 (1992). License to be carried when driving. Production in court.
(1) The licensee shall have his license in his immediate possession at all times when
operating a motor vehicle and shall display it upon demand of a justice of peace, a peace officer,
or a field deputy or inspector of the division.
(2) It is a defense to a charge under this section that the person charged produce in court
a license issued to him and valid at the time of his citation or arrest.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (1992). Operators must be licensed-Taxicab
endorsement
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under Section 41-2-107,41-2108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2-121(4), or Title 41, Chapter 22, may
operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is licensed
as an operator by the division under this chapter.

